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Abstract  
 
 
Building on framing research and on cognitive dissonance theory, the paper examines the 
differentiated moderating effect of party discourse on prejudiced attitudes against immigrants.  
Using ESS 2002 data, the study finds that those who are positively oriented towards 
immigrants become more so when confronted with party discourses with anti-immigrant 
tones. This effect is however visible only when it comes to acceptance in one's private sphere 
(acceptance of interethnic marriage). The study also found some evidence that friendship with 
immigrants is not strong enough to impede natives of accepting the idea of exclusion of 
unemployed immigrants. 
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Introduction 
Introducing the 2013 Queen’s Speech, Prime Minister Cameron noted that “Our resolve to 
turn our country around has never been stronger”.1 The Speech outlining future policy 
directions, included, among others, immigration measures aimed at restricting migrants' 
access to healthcare and tackling illegal immigration. Such discourses reflect policy makers' 
responses to the public’s policy preferences and opinions. But equally important, are means 
through which politicians and policy-makers actively try to influence the public (Ingram and 
Schneider 1993). Do they succeed? This article addresses this question, by investigating the 
effects of discourse on natives' anti-immigrant prejudice.  
   Political climate and anti-immigrant discourses have been found to have negative 
effects on attitudes as diverse as generalised anti-immigrant attitudes (Semyonov et al. 2006, 
2008; Bohman 2011) and support for redistribution (Schmidt and Spies 2014). However, there 
are reasons to doubt that the effects of anti-immigrant messages transmitted by parties are 
negative across the board: Cognitive dissonance theory posits that individuals are driven to 
seek consonance between new information and held beliefs, values and information. In order 
to achieve consonance, individuals lower the importance of the discordant information, but if 
the new information received conforms to held beliefs, it is used to strengthen those beliefs 
(Festinger 1957). This mechanism has been confirmed by experiments in political 
communication which have shown that individual predispositions affect the effectiveness of 
frames. In this light, it is likely that the party discourses have a differentiated effect on the 
relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes towards migrants. Moreover, as 
different anti-immigrant attitudes are generated by different sets of characteristics, it is likely 
that the effects of political discourses differ between attitudes. This study investigates these 
                                                 
1
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/queens-speech-2013-overview 
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assumptions by exploring the impact of party discourses on two concrete instances of anti-
immigrant prejudice: rejection of interethnic marriage and support for expulsion of 
unemployed immigrants.  
Studying whether and how prejudiced opinions react to party discourse is of utmost 
importance in the context of integration debates. If integration of migrants is a two-way 
process, it depends not only on migrants' efforts but also on the natives' attitudes and 
openness. Thus, the natives’ prejudices and their propensity to reject immigrants from core 
areas of social interaction (family and labour market) is a major brake against the latter's 
integration. Understanding the connection between these rejection attitudes and party 
discourse might improve the calibration of integration measures. 
 The article brings two contributions to the literature: First, while most of the existing 
studies focus on the direct effects of anti-immigrant parties, this analysis explores possible 
indirect paths from party discourse to attitudes. Second, by analysing two rejection attitudes in 
the blatant prejudice spectrum, the study throws light on a more complex reality. Although 
previous studies have shown that the anti-immigrant discourse leads to more negative 
attitudes, this study shows that prejudiced attitudes are affected differently by discourse: the 
presence of nationalist discourse strengthens the propensity of those positively oriented 
towards immigrants to support interethnic marriage, but it does not have the same effect in 
case of expulsion of unemployed immigrants.  
The theoretical part builds on framing research and on cognitive dissonance theory to 
develop hypotheses regarding the differentiated moderating effect of party discourse. The 
third part presents the data and the method, while the fourth part presents the analysis. The 
last part discusses the findings and concludes.  
 
 4 
Theory 
Defined as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport 1958:10), 
prejudice is an attitude related to generalised feelings of threat, perceived competition or 
overall negative attitudes towards foreigners (Zick, Pettigrew, Wagner 2008; Wagner et al. 
2006; Velasco Gonzales et al. 2008; Stephan et al. 1998). According to Pettigrew and 
Meertens (1995) there are two types of prejudice, blatant and subtle. Blatant prejudice is "hot, 
close and direct" and is easily recognizable in explicit opposition to intimacy with out-group 
members (at job or in family life), discrimination and overt racism. Subtle prejudice is "cool, 
distant, and indirect” and is expressed through exaggeration of cultural differences, defense of 
national values or denial of positive emotions towards the out-groups (Pettigrew and Meertens 
1995:58).  
 Prejudiced attitudes attracted a great deal of scholarly attention resulting in the 
thorough exploration of the possible determinants. Several of them have been repeatedly 
confirmed to matter. First and foremost, they have been found to be strongly associated to 
competition over labour market positions (Savekoul et al. 2011; Scheepers, Gijberts & 
Coenders 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Quillian 1995; Kunovich 2004; Tolsma et al. 
2008). Secondly, perception of a zero-sum game between in- and out-groups has led in-group 
members to display discriminatory attitudes (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Esses et al. 
2001). Thirdly, it has been showed that contact with foreigners (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and 
Tropp 2006) matters. The negative impact of contact on prejudice and discrimination has 
found widespread support (see for example Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Wagner et al. 
2006), while Hamberger and Hewstone (1997) and Pettigrew (1997) showed that the 
friendship with foreigners reduces the prejudice of dominant group members. Tolsma et al. 
(2008) found a nuanced impact of the out-group proximity: at municipality level it reduced 
the opposition to interethnic marriage, but at neighborhood level it increased it. Their study 
also found that the presence of out-group members in the neighborhood increases the 
 5 
opposition to interethnic marriage among the low educated, and decreases it among the highly 
educated. Fourthly, structural conditions, such as number of foreigners, decreasing GDP and 
increasing unemployment, have both direct and moderating effects (Hjerm 2007; Pichler 
2010; Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Semyonov et al. 2004, Savekoul et al. 2011; Scheepers, 
Gijberts & Coenders 2002). 
 
Anti-immigrant discourse 
This article argues that another factor likely to influence prejudice is the discourse of relevant 
political actors, in particular parties. Parties do not only inform the public about facts such as 
the number of foreigners or the state of the economy, but also explain and contextualize this 
information. In doing so, politicians react to public opinion, and, importantly, also attempt to 
influence it. Through discourse, they “actively participate in values’ formation and 
perpetuation” (Ingram and Schneider 1993: 70). Exposure to such contextualizing discourses 
contributes to individuals’ sense-making of reality and consequently, to the formation of their 
attitudes towards out-groups.  
 Previous research has shown that parties do influence opinions. For example, the 
electorate takes cues from party positions and policy information and the effect varies with 
levels of disagreement among parties, party unity, issue salience and party attachment (Ray 
2003; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Bullock 2011). Whether and to what extent parties influence 
specific anti-foreigners attitudes has gained attention only relatively recently. In fact, it has 
been the opposite relation that has been mostly researched – namely the anti-immigrant 
attitudes leading to support for right-wing parties (for example, Lubbers & Scheepers 2000, 
2002; Lubbers et al. 2002). Not surprisingly, evidence that parties stir anti-immigrant attitudes 
has been found in the case of openly anti-immigrant parties (Billiet and DeWitte 2008) or 
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when these parties gained political visibility (Semyonov et al. 2006, 2007, 2008; Wilkes et al. 
2007).  
 However, the path from discourse to attitudes remains debated. Most of the existing 
research posits and finds direct effects of anti-immigrant discourse on attitudes. However, 
some recent articles suggest that the party discourse has more nuanced effects. For example, 
using the Comparative Manifesto Project data, Bohman (2011) distinguished between 
different sources of discourse and found that attitudes towards immigrants become more 
negative when traditional left and right parties produce a pro-national discourse. She also 
found that left-leaning individuals were more influenced when left parties raised the 
immigrant-related issues. Using the same data, Schmidt and Spiess (2014) argued that parties 
strategically use the salience of migration issues to delegitimize the support for welfare state.  
 Psychology and framing research offer valuable insights on the potential paths from 
party discourse to attitudes. While it is known that identity, ideological values or symbolic 
interests make individuals susceptible to discursive influences, the cognitive dissonance 
theory (Festinger 1957) posits that the same discourse does not have the same effect on all 
recipients. More specifically, if the message is congruent with individual existing orientations 
and opinions, then it is assimilated and used to reinforce them, while a challenging message is 
rejected or disregarded.  
 This theory has found support in studies in political communication, especially 
framing effects. Plenty of evidence has been brought not only that the way messages are 
communicated (i.e. the frames, defined as interpretations of facts produced by interested 
actors with the aim of swinging the public in a particular direction) makes a difference (see 
Druckman (2001) and Chong and Druckman (2007) for an overview), but also that frames 
have a differentiated effect in function of individual characteristics. For example, it has been 
shown that individuals' assessment of source credibility as well as engagement in deliberative 
activities on the topic of the frame affect frames' effectiveness in influencing individuals 
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(Druckman 2001; Chong and Druckman 2007). Information in general, and sophistication 
regarding the topic of the frame in particular, offset or strengthen the effect of frames. For 
example, Kinder and Sanders (1990) found that better informed individuals are more resistant 
to frames because they are more likely to develop a coherent understanding of sociopolitical 
reality on their own. In addition to involvement and information, a factor that has consistently 
been found to be a particularly strong filter for frames are individual predispositions. 
Moreover, predispositions, existing beliefs and values, not only result in rejection or 
acceptance of frames (Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001; Federico & Sidanius 2002), as cognitive 
dissonance theory predicts, but also may push attitudes in the opposite direction to the frame, 
because individuals generate counterarguments when confronted with challenging frames 
(Gross 2000).  
 This article examines two attitudes belonging to the blatant prejudice spectrum 
(Pettigrew and Mertens 1995), which capture rejection of immigrants from two arenas of 
social interaction: support for deportation of unemployed immigrants and opposition to 
interethnic marriage. They are linked to situations which entail two different logics. On the 
one hand, support for deportation reflects that fact that relations on the labor market involve a 
great deal of competitiveness, as jobs are often seen as scarce goods. Moreover, presence of a 
pool of potential cheap labour is likely to be seen as a threat to wage level, and by implication 
to life standards. On the other hand, accepting newcomers in the family means opening the 
private sphere and therefore, the issue of interethnic marriage touches the core of the concept 
of social distance. Thus, the two prejudiced attitudes are expected to be have different 
correlates at individual level, and consequently, to be differently affected by parties' 
discourses. 
 Based on the cognitive resonance theory, predispositions are expected to interact with 
discourse in shaping anti-immigrant prejudices. However, in addition to predispositions, it can 
be argued that individual circumstances also 'filter'  discourse. Previous findings indicate that 
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labour market position and friendships with foreigners are individual circumstances with 
strong effects on anti-immigrant attitudes. They are therefore most likely to be influenced by 
party discourses. For example, having a precarious labour market position is likely to generate 
more receptiveness to discourses that suggest competition between in- and out-groups for 
scarce resources. Similarly, being in direct contact with foreigners might increase sensitivity 
to discourses which define "our" vs. "their", communities or cultures. 
 
 
Summing up the points raised above, the following hypotheses are proposed 
 
H1 Precarious labour market position is associated with prejudiced attitudes. Because labour 
market position is expected to play an important role in positioning individuals vis-a-vis 
immigrants-as-labour market competitor, but less so in the case of immigrants-as-family 
members, it is hypothesized that an anti-immigrant discourse strengthens the relationship 
between labour market position and support for deportation (H1a), and has no impact on the 
relationship between labour market position and opposition to interethnic marriage (H1b).  
 
H2 Having immigrant friends is expected to generate positive attitudes towards immigrants. 
Having immigrant friends might increase the sensitivity of natives to political discourses 
which focus on national community, on nation and foreigners, on cultural differences and 
similarities. Such a discourse would challenge the existing preferences (expressed though 
having friendships with foreigners) and according to cognitive dissonance theory would be 
rejected. It is thus expected that an anti-immigrant discourse has no effect on the relationship 
between having immigrant friends and support for deportation (H2a), and on the relationship 
between having immigrant friends and social discrimination (H2b). However, if the 
challenging discourses stimulate individuals to generate counterarguments, as Gross (2000) 
suggests, then the presence of anti-immigrant discourse strengthens the effect of friendship, 
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both in case of support for deportation (H2c), and in the case of opposition to interethnic 
marriage (H2d). 
 
H3 Predispositions are expected to dampen or enhance the effects of discourse. An anti-
immigrant discourse is expected to enhance the effect of negative predispositions on both 
prejudiced attitudes (H3a). However, positive predispositions are expected to lead to a 
rejection of the party discourse. Thus, it is posited that anti-immigrants discourse has no effect 
on the relationships between positive predispositions and both prejudiced attitudes (H3b). 
Following Gross' (2000) argument, the positive predispositions can turn the effect of 
discourse in the opposite direction, resulting to the strengthening of their effect on both 
prejudiced attitudes (H3c).  
 
 
Data, method and variables  
The 2002 wave of the European Social Survey provides the individual level data. Out of 
the 22 countries included in the survey, data from 17 Western European countries are 
analysed. Israel was excluded due to its particular approach to immigration. The four Eastern 
European countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) were excluded for 
several reasons. First, as of 2000, right before the data collection took place, the number of 
immigrants in these countries was very low: Eurostat records ca. 22000 foreigners in 
Hungary, 6500 in Poland, 13000 in the Czech Republic and 7800 in Slovenia. Consequently, 
arguably, their visibility in the public sphere and as a topic for party discourses is likely to 
have been low (Wallace 2002). At the same time, previous research suggests that the answers 
to questions about immigrants are likely to reflect the Eastern Europeans' experience with 
ethnic minorities living on the territories of these countries, but not actual experience with 
immigrants (Nyiri 2003; Strabac and Listaug 2008). Moreover, a recent analysis of 
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comparability of indexes of attitudes towards immigrants using ESS data also shows that 
Eastern European respondents differ from their Western counterparts, and attributes their 
different response patterns to the experience with minorities (such as Roma) rather than 
experiences with immigrants (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2009) . While the point that the 
Eastern Europeans' answers to questions about immigrants in fact reflect more general 
attitudes towards foreigners could be made, it is likely that such an argument tends to ignore 
that the ethnic minorities living on the territories of Eastern European countries are citizens of 
these countries, and therefore the label "foreigners" would not be correctly applied. Since the 
survey questions are specifically refer to "people who come here from another country", and 
given the evidence presented above, in order to keep the reference category "immigrants" 
clear, the Eastern European countries were excluded. The effective sample (only cases 
without missing values) contains 19188 respondents without immigrant background from 
Western European countries. 
 
 Method 
 As the dependent variables are measured on ordinal scales (ie they have a natural 
ordering, but the distances between adjacent levels are unknown), and are not normally 
distributed, ordered logit models are applied to test the hypotheses. The standard errors are 
clustered by country.  
 
Variables 
 The two dependent variables are approval of deportation of unemployed immigrants 
and opposition to inter-ethnic marriage. Both are measured on ordinal scales, where the 
higher end indicates prejudiced attitudes (for details, see Table 1A in the online Appendix).  
Although both items belong to the blatant prejudice spectrum and, following Pettigrew and 
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Meertens (1995), could be included in one index, they are analyzed separately for two 
reasons. First, as argued, they capture interactions on two different social arenas and thus 
reflect different logics. Second, their correlation is rather weak (r=0.29), suggesting that they 
tap different prejudices and therefore might have different sets of individual and contextual 
correlates.  
 The main independent variables are the interactions of party discourse with selected 
individual characteristics that are theoretically expected to attenuate or enhance the effects of 
discourse. Friendship with immigrants is measured with a dichotomous variable which takes 
the value 1 for having immigrant friends and 0 for none. Labour market precariousness is 
tapped by a dichotomous variable (unemployed) which takes value 1 when the respondent is 
unemployed and actively looking for work at the time of interview. Being liberal or 
conservative are relevant predispositions when it comes to acceptance or rejection of 
immigrants. The conservative orientations of respondents are measured with unequivocal 
rejection of the statement that gays and lesbians have the right to live their lives as they wish. 
Rejection has been calculated by summing up ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ response 
categories of a five-point scale agree/disagree scale. Liberal values are tapped by a proxy, 
namely compassionate feelings for those worse off, as compassion has been found to be 
strongly correlated to liberal values (Hirsh et al. 2010). They are measured with a 
dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 if respondents placed themselves higher than 6 
on the ten-point scale, where higher values indicate more compassionate feelings. 
   Capturing the presence of an anti-immigrant discourse presents scholars with several 
challenges. Some authors have analysed party discourse through party-issued documents or 
media interventions (Boomgaarden and Vliengenthart 2009; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). 
While this is the most appropriate way to proceed and has produced valuable insights, it has 
the disadvantage that it cannot cover many cases. In fact, these studies are single country 
analyses. For cross-country comparisons other authors have used the proportion of votes 
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received by extreme right parties as an indicator for the anti-immigrant political and 
ideological climate (Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008). While the presence of such parties is often 
associated with anti-immigrant discourse, the use of the right-wing vote share as an indicator 
of the ideological climate is problematic because the vote share reflects not only the anti-
immigrant feelings, but also the opportunity structure of these parties to act in the national 
political arena (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). More importantly, an (anti)immigrant discourse 
is not anymore the trademark of right-wing parties. Mainstream parties are increasingly 
present in the debate about the role of immigrants, their rights and obligations, the definition 
of national communities or multiculturalism (Stratham 2003; van der Brug and Fennema 
2003; Tränhardt 1995). Therefore, a different measure is needed.  
An alternative is offered by the Comparative Manifesto Project, which contains 
information as to the percentage of the electoral manifestos devoted to specific topics. The 
dataset covers a large number of elections and parties and provides a relatively accurate 
picture of the salience of the different topics in the parties' manifestos (for detailed discussion, 
see Budge et al. 2001). The dataset does not contain explicit immigration- and immigrants-
related items, but it provides several items which define the national community "us" and 
reflect on multiculturalism. This article uses the nationalist and anti-multiculturalist 
statements in the electoral manifestos as a proxy for anti-immigrant party discourse (see also 
Bohman 2011; Schmidt and Spies 2014). In order to observe whether a party's manifesto 
reflects a nationalist or a multicultural tone the proportion of nationalist (per601) and anti-
multiculturalism statements (per608) are added. From this sum, the proportion of pro-
multiculturalist statements (per607) is deducted. A positive value indicates that the party 
manifesto contains more nationalist and anti-multiculturalism statements, i.e. a salient anti-
immigrant discourse. These differences are calculated for each party. In a subsequent step, 
they are multiplied with the proportion of votes obtained by the respective party in the 
election preceding the EVS 2002/2003 wave. If the proportion of votes is an indicator of the 
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visibility of parties in the public arena, then the multiplication provides an indication of the 
visibility of the party message.2 In a last step, these values are summed up for all the parties in 
a country. The final values indicate whether nationalist statements (positive values) dominate 
over multiculturalist statements (negative values) in the overall party discourse. The final 
values were z-standardised (for a similar procedure see Schmidt and Spies 2014).  
 Several variables identified by previous research as relevant for anti-immigrant 
attitudes are included as controls (for measurement, see Table 1A in the Online Appendix). In 
order to control for general opinions about immigrants’ impact, an index of 6 ordinal scale 
items(Crombach’s alpha for the pooled sample 0.837)3 was used. Left-right self-placement 
controls for ideological preferences, while perceived number of immigrants controls for 
perceptions that there are too many immigrants in the country. Political interest controls for 
attention to political matters and information and EGP controls for status, using 5 status 
categories, a condensed version of the original eleven category EGP classification scheme 
created by Erikson et al (1979). In addition, age, gender, area of residence, and education 
were controlled for. At country level, unemployment rate (average of 1998-2002) is used to 
control for economic situation. No specific hypotheses are formulated regarding the controls. 
However, as these variables are well documented in the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes, 
the usual effects are expected. Table 2A (Online Appendix) includes the correlations between 
all individual-level variables, indicating that there are no worrying collinearity between the 
determinants included in the model. 
  
                                                 
2
 Multiplying the scores with the party electoral results aims to also take into account the fact that not only the 
content of discourse matter, but also its visibility in the public sphere. A better measure which would capture 
aspects such as quality, concent and dynamic of the discourse, as well as information about the actors involved 
in the production of this discourse is currently not available for cross-countries comparative studies. Therefore, 
this study is based on the assumption that the proposed measure is a proxy, albeit criticisable, of the salience and 
visibility of nationalist or multicultural topics in party discourse.    
3
 In single countries, Crombach alpha ranges from .71 (Luxembourg) to .88 (Great Britain) (see Table 3A  in the 
Appendix). In order to reduce the number of missings, the index was calculated if a respondent provided  at least 
4 valid answers out of 6.  
 14
Analysis 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the analysis for support for deportation of unemployed 
immigrants and opposition to interethnic marriage, respectively. The two tables are 
constructed identically: the first models (M1) include only the individual-level controls, 
models M2 include the variables of interest at individual level, models M3 include the country 
level variables, and models M4 include the interactions of selected individual characteristics 
with the anti-immigrant discourse. The column H summarizes the hypotheses: the signs - or + 
designate the expected effect of individual characteristics, ‘strenghtens’ designates the 
expected effects of the party discourse on the selected individual-level relationships. Zero 
indicates expected absence of effects.  
 Models M1 in both tables indicate that the controls have overall the expected effects. 
These effects are stable across the models. However, some differences between the two 
attitudes can be noted. Living in multicultural neighbourhoods, having overall positive 
opinions about migrants and being female decrease the  odds of opposing interethnic 
marriage, while absence of political interest, being older and leaning towards the political 
right increase the odds of opposition to interethnic marriage. The odds of supporting 
deportation are associated to rightist political views and perception of large numbers of 
immigrants, while higher levels of education and general positive opinions about immigrants 
decrease the odds.   
 Models M2 include the individual characteristics of interest. Friendship with 
immigrants and conservative attitudes have significant effects in expected directions: having 
immigrant friends decrease the odds of both supporting deportation (Table 1) and opposing 
interethnic marriage (Table 2), while conservative attitudes have the opposite effect on both 
dependent variables. Precariousness on the labour market increases the odds to oppose 
interethnic marriage (Table 2), as expected, but has no effect of support for expulsion (Table 
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1). The absence of an effect in the latter case is unexpected, as it runs against the logic of 
competition arguments.  
 Models M3 include the country-level variables, party discourse and unemployment 
rate. Both sets of results indicate that these predictors do not have a direct effect on the 
variables of interest. This result is not completely unexpected, as the previous research is also 
ambiguous as to the direct effects of country level variables: some studies find an effect 
(Semyonov et al. 2006; 2008), while others not (Schmidt and Spiess 2014). One possible 
explanation is that the country-level factors have an effect only through their impact on 
individual characteristics. Therefore the Models M4 include the interactions between party 
discourse and the four selected characteristics. Adjusted Wald test indicate that the four 
interaction terms are not simultaneously equal to zero (for support for expulsion, chi2(four 
degrees of freedom)=12.63, prob 0.013, for rejection of interethnic marriage chi2(four degrees 
of freedom)=16.73, prob 0.002). In the case of support for deportation (Table1), the expected 
effects of party discourse on precarious labour market position (H1a), and on conservative 
values (H3a) have not been observed. The interaction between discourse and liberal values is 
also nonsignificant, but this absence of an effect was theoretically expected, confirming thus 
H3b The interaction effect with immigrant friends is significant and has a positive sign, 
suggesting that as the discourse becomes more nationalistic, it weakens the relationship 
between having immigrant friends and support for deportation of immigrants. This finding 
seems to disconfirm both Hypotheses H2a and H2c, which predicted that nationalist discourse 
will be filtered away or turned around by friendship. In the case of opposition to interethnic 
marriage (Table 2) the party discourse does not interact with precarious labour market 
position, as expected by Hypothesis H1b. The nonsignificant interaction between discourse 
and conservative attitudes disconfirms the expectation formulated in Hypothesis H3a. Party 
discourse moderates the relationships of opposition to interethnic marriage with both having 
immigrant friends and having liberal values: as the party discourse becomes more 
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nationalistic, natives who have immigrant friends and who have liberal values become more 
supportive of interethnic marriage. This finding confirms Hypothesis H2d, and the insight of 
Gross (2000) that certain predisposition can push attitudes in the opposite direction to the 
discursive frames.  
 
***Table 1 here*** 
***Table 2 here*** 
 
 Graphs  1-4 illustrate the observed contradictory effects of friendship with immigrants 
on the two dependent variables, at various levels of party discourse. Graph 1 illustrates the 
marginal effect of having immigrants friends on the probability of observing rejection of the 
idea of deporting unemployed immigrants. The effect is weak (the line is almost horizontal) 
and becomes insignificant as the discourse becomes overtly nationalistic. Graph 2 illustrates 
that as the discourse includes more nationalist statements, the probability of observing support 
for deportation among those who have immigrant friends increases slightly, although becomes 
insignificant as the discourse becomes overtly nationalistic. Graph 3 illustrates the marginal 
effect of having immigrant friend on the probability of observing support for interethnic 
marriages. As the discourse includes more nationalist statements the probability of observing 
support increases. Graph 4 illustrates that the change in the degree of nationalism of party 
discourse does not affect the probability of observing opposition to interethnic marriage 
among those who have immigrant friends.4  
 
***Graph 1 here ***  
*** Graph 2 here***  
*** Graph 3 here*** 
                                                 
4
 The marginal effect of having liberal values on rejection of interethnic marriage (not shown) has a pattern 
similar to the one of having immigrant friends.  
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*** Graph 4 here*** 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
What and how is communicated matters a great deal in opinion formation. People use parties’ 
statements as cues to form, justify or consolidate their own opinions. While there is a lot of 
scholarly agreement that party discourses influence opinions, it is less clear whether different 
opinions are similarly affected. In an effort at providing some evidence in this direction, the 
present article explored whether and how does the anti-immigrant discourse influence 
Western Europeans’ prejudices towards immigrants. Two attitudes belonging to the blatant 
prejudice spectrum are in focus: agreement with expulsion of unemployed immigrants and 
opposition to interethnic marriage. Ordinal logit models with country clustered errors are 
employed to analyse data for 17 Western European countries provided by the ESS 2002.  
 The theoretical framework of the article draws on research in sociology, political 
science and psychology. Contact and competition theories have provided solid ground for 
sociological and political science accounts to explain Western Europeans’ anti-immigrant 
attitudes. Building on their findings, this paper draws on the cognitive dissonance theory and 
framing research to underpin the mechanisms though which political parties’ discourse about 
nation and multiculturalism influence individuals’ predispositions to express anti-immigrant 
prejudice. According to this research, individuals ‘filter’ party messages through their 
predispositions and their socio-economic positions. Therefore, it was expected that the same 
party message has different impact on various categories of respondents. Moreover, since 
prejudice can be targeted at different kinds of social interactions, which differ in their 
openness to public discourse, the effect of party message was expected to differ across 
attitudes.  
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 The study found that although party discourse does not have a direct effect on 
prejudice, it is filtered by some individual characteristics, as suggested by psychology and 
framing research. This finding substantiate the idea of an indirect mechanism from party to 
prejudice. In addition, the study has found some evidence to indicate that the party discourse 
has differentiated effects on the two prejudiced attitudes. These results complement earlier 
findings on the effects of parties and party discourse. On the one hand, the study confirms the 
recent results of Bohmann (2011) and Schmidt and Spiess (2014) that presence of anti-
immigrant party discourse affects natives' policy preferences and their attitudes about 
immigrants. On the other hand, by analysing the impact of discourse on two different 
prejudiced attitudes, the study provides evidence that the effect of parties' discourse is more 
nuanced that previous research might have suggested. In the following, these differences will 
be discussed and commented upon. 
 In the case of opposition to interethnic marriage, the increased nationalist character of 
party discourse makes those holding liberal values as well as those who have immigrant 
friends more supportive of interethnic marriage. In other words, when presented with anti-
immigrant statements, those natives positively oriented towards immigrants become even 
more open and willing to include migrants in their personal sphere. At the same time, party 
discourse does not seem to have an effect on the relationships between opposition to 
interethnic marriage and precarious labour market position and conservative attitudes, 
respectively. While the absence of an effect in the case of former was theoretically expected, 
its absence in the case of latter is surprising and suggests that party discourse does not make 
those with conservative values more opposed to interethnic marriage than they already are. 
One can read these findings as indicating that when it comes to attitudes which regard the 
private sphere such as preference for family formation, the party discourse does not manage to 
make natives more opposed to migrants, but, more importantly, in certain conditions, it makes 
them even more inclined to accept migrants. Overall, this can be seen as a good sign. If social 
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integration of immigrants and their being accepted in the host societies (signalled by 
willingness of natives to accept them as family members) cannot be easily swayed into 
negative directions by party discourse, it can be taken as a positive sign for the integration 
prospects of immigrants.  
 The second prejudiced attitude analysed here tells a slightly different story, however. 
In the case of support for expulsion in case of unemployment, although with the surprising 
insignificance of being unemployed, all the other individual-level characteristics display the 
expected effects, the party discourse does not interact with conservative attitudes, with 
precarious labour market position and with liberal values. While the absence of interaction 
with the latter can be interpreted in the light of psychology research as a result of the 
"barriers" which liberal values raise to discourses which challenge them, the absence of 
effects in the case of the former two comes as a surprise, as they seem to challenge 
predictions of competition and psychology theories, which have been often confirmed in 
previous studies. A possible explanation is the peculiarity of the dependent variable, which 
asks respondents to which extent they agree with expulsion of unemployed immigrants. This 
is a radical measure and a sensitive issue, and therefore, it is likely that many respondents 
refrain to report their true preference. It is also likely that the reticence of respondents is 
linked to the context of survey. At the beginning of 2000s, the discourse surrounding 
immigration, although much more present in the public sphere in all Western Europe, it had 
not taken the strong negative accents that characterise it in the recent years.  
 At the same time, an interesting effect was observed. While party discourse could not 
affect the effect of liberal predispositions, it seems to diminish the effect of friendship. This 
effect appears to be significant as the discourse become more nationalistic, but not overtly 
nationalistic. This goes against the theoretical expectations and runs against the pattern 
observed in case to opposition to interethnic marriage. However, an explanation can be put 
forward, building on the fact that since the early 1990s the mainstream parties are explicitly 
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involved in the discourse around immigrants and their rights. This explanation cannot be 
tested with the existing data, as precise cross-country comparative information about the 
content of discourse is not currently available. Therefore, it is proposed as a future research 
direction. There is plenty of evidence that the economic position of emigrants focusing on 
which immigrants and in which conditions should access the labour markets, unavoidably 
touching the issue of unemployment, has been discussed by parties and in other fora and has 
been accessible to the national publics (Careja and Andreß 2013). Moreover, it is known that 
a strong distinction between desired and undesired labour immigrants has been promoted by 
the mainstream parties in order to make more palatable some policies that opened certain 
labour market sectors to immigrants (Menz 2010; Caviedes 2009). Assuming that this 
discourse complements the party discourse captured in the manifestos, the fact that the 
opposition of natives with immigrant friends to expulsion is diminished under the effect of 
party discourse below the threshold of outright nationalistic discourse seems to suggest that 
natives of Western European countries are sensitive to the arguments of mainstream parties. 
Under this interpretation, the findings of this study support an earlier finding of Bohman 
(2011) which showed that the effect of anti-immigrant discourse on anti-immigrant attitudes 
increases as the discourse is articulated by mainstream parties. Thus, while it may seem that in 
general party discourse does not affect natives' propensity to support expulsion of 
unemployed immigrants, the anti-immigrant tones of mainstream parties do not fall on deaf 
ears.  
These results cannot be dissociated from the specifics of the context when the study 
was conducted. At the beginning of 2000s debates surrounding immigration, not least in the 
light of upcoming EU enlargement, mushroomed, but, importantly, no crisis cloud was 
looming at the horizon. The immigration discourse was free of some of the acute negative 
tones it took in the wake of the economic crisis across all old EU member states. To some 
extent, the weakness of the relationships observed could be explained by the fact that 
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respondents were asked to express agreement with two strong prejudices at a time when the 
context was not strongly anti-immigrant. Many things have changed since 2002. The 
experience of ten years of enlarged Europe accompanied by an increase of intra-European 
migration from the new to old EU member states, and a major crisis biting European 
economies' are likely to leave profound marks on public opinion. Importantly, the 
immigration discourse has become increasingly open and blunt. Moreover, while for long 
time expulsion of immigrants was considered only in case of crimes, recently, expulsion in 
relation to unemployment has been brought to attention and presented as a policy proposal, as 
in the recent debates in Germany or UK. In spring 2014 German authorities have moved to 
consider new regulation which allows expulsion of immigrants who are unable to find work 
within three months after entry (Euractiv News, 27.03.2014; RT News 27.03.2014; Financial 
Times 26.03.2014). Such debates and regulatory measures are likely to strongly legitimize in 
the eyes of the public expulsion as a policy measure. Therefore, one could reasonably expect 
that a 2014 survey would capture clearer relationships of support for expulsion, compared to 
the 2002 survey used in this analysis. Whether these relationships would take the directions 
observed in this study, is the task of further research to uncover.  
 Summing up,  taken together the findings of this study also suggest that Western 
Europeans receive party discourse differently when it comes to different spheres of life. In a 
non-crisis context, those who are positively oriented towards immigrants become more so 
when confronted with party discourses with anti-immigrant tones. The propensity of the pro-
immigrant native population to socially include immigrants could be interpreted as good news 
for the integration prospects of immigrants. This effect is however visible only when it comes 
to acceptance in one's private sphere (acceptance of interethnic marriage). The study also 
found some evidence that friendship with immigrants is not strong enough to impede natives 
of accepting the idea of exclusion of unemployed immigrants. This finding is somewhat 
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worrying because it suggests that certain forms of prejudice can become more accepted, 
arguably when the anti-immigrant message is produced by more mainstream parties.  
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Tables  
 
 
Table 1 Results for support for expulsion of unemployed immigrants (log odds) 
 
H M1 M2 M3 M4 
immigrant friends - -0.241*** -0.237*** -0.235*** 
liberal values - -0.120** -0.120** -0.119** 
conservative values + 0.280*** 0.272*** 0.263*** 
unemployed + -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 
Country-level 
unemployment rate + -0.002 -0.002 
party discourse + -0.057 -0.092 
* immigrantfriends 0/strengthens 0.080* 
* liberal values 0/strengthens -0.008 
* conservative values strengthens -0.045 
* unemployed strengthens -0.006 
Controls 
opinions about immigrants  - -0.659*** -0.635*** -0.639*** -0.640*** 
political interest + 0.100* 0.086 0.076 0.076 
left-right scale + 0.089*** 0.850*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
Egp: high service class ref ref ref ref 
lower service class -0.099 -0.108 -0.110 -0.110 
self employed 0.117 0.092 0.086 0.090 
routine non-manual 0.050 0.330 0.026 0.029 
manual workers + 0.026 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
neighbourhood - 0.013 0.041 0.048 0.046 
proportion of immigrants + 0.007** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008** 
age - 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
education - -0.033** -0.031** -0.033* -0.032* 
residence area:  large city ref ref ref ref 
suburbs large city 0.059 0.068 0.061 0.058 
small town 0.053 0.049 0.045 0.043 
rural 0.099 0.093 0.095 0.090 
 female -0.086 -0.074 -0.075 -0.073 
McFadden's R2 0.116 0.118 0.119 0.119 
AIC 46426.72 46312.64 46292.91 46281.26 
N 17543 17543 17543 17543 
 
Source: ESS 2002 (unweighted) 
Note: Standard errors in parantheses. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
In column H, - indicates an expected negative effect, + an expected positive effect, 0 
an expected no effect. 
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Table 2 Results for opposition to interethnic marriage (log odds) 
 
H M1 M2 M3 M4 
immigrant friends - -0.456*** -0.451*** -0.454*** 
liberal values - -0.155** -0.157** -0.158*** 
conservative values + 0.428*** 0.416*** 0.422*** 
unemployed + 0.107* 0.098* 0.102* 
Country-level 
unemployment rate + 0.014 0.013 
party discourse + -0.003 0.090 
* immigrant friends 0/strengthens -0.052* 
* liberal values 0/strengthens -0.092* 
* conservative values strengthens 0.038 
* unemployed 0 0.047 
Controls 
opinions about immigrants  - -0.458*** -0.418*** -0.417*** -0.418*** 
political interest + 0.089*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 
left-right scale + 0.115*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 
Egp: high service class Ref Ref Ref Ref 
lower service class -0.018 -0.035 -0.037 -0.038 
self employed 0.210** 0.164* 0.146* 0.144* 
routine non-manual 0.088* 0.051 0.050 0.048 
manual workers + 0.145*** 0.101* 0.094* 0.093 
neighbourhood - -0.128** -0.078* -0.082* -0.082* 
proportion of immigrants + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
age + 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
education - -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
residence area: large city Ref Ref Ref Ref 
suburbs large city 0.083 0.097 0.114 0.115 
small town 0.072 0.062 0.072 0.075 
rural 0.152* 0.142* 0.161 0.163 
 female -0.135*** -0.120*** -0.121*** -0.123*** 
McFadden's R2 0.054 0.059 0.059 0.059 
AIC 72218.91 71853.17 71844.42 71828.55 
N 17543 17543 17543 17543 
 
 
 
Source: ESS 2002 (unweighted) 
Note: Standard errors in parantheses. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
In column H, - indicates an expected negative effect, + an expected positive effect, 0 
an expected no effect. 
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Graph 1 Conditional marginal effects of having immigrant friends on the probability of 
observing rejection of immigrant deportation at various levels of party discourse 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2 Conditional marginal effects of having immigrant friends on the probability of 
observing support for immigrant deportation at various levels of party discourse 
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Graph 3  Conditional marginal effects of having immigrant friends on the probability of 
observing support for interethnic marriage at various levels of party discourse (95% CI) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4  Conditional marginal effects of having immigrant friends on the probability of 
observing opposition to interethnic marriage at various levels of party discourse (95% CI) 
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